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How Monitoring Influences Trust: A Tale of Two Faces

ABSTRACT

Organizations operate more effectively when managers trust their employees. In many cases,
however, managers and their employees have divergent interests. One common managerial
approach to address the problem of misaligned incentives involves monitoring employee behavior.
In this paper, we investigate how monitoring changes the behavior of both those who are monitored
and those who monitor others. We paired participants in a repeated trust game with a stochastic
ending in which we manipulated both the frequency of monitoring and whether or not monitoring
was anticipated. When trustees who were monitored could anticipate monitoring, they engaged in
strategic behavior; trustees chose self-interested actions when they anticipated that they would not
be monitored, but chose altruistic actions when they anticipated that they would be monitored.
Trustors, however, failed to appreciate how strategically their counterparts would act. Though
trustors were more trusting when they could monitor their counterpart than when they could not,
they were still much too trusting when their inability to monitor their counterpart was anticipated.
We discuss managerial implications of these results for designing and using monitoring systems.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Trust plays a central role in individual relationships, in organizations, and in communities

(Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2007). Trust promotes cooperation (Pillutla, Malhotra &
Murnighan, 2003) and broadly impacts workplace behaviors (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Kim, Dirks,
Cooper & Ferrin, 2006). Managers who develop trusting relationships with their employees are
more effective and able to develop higher performance teams.
Many managers, however, may misplace their trust. For example, managers frequently trust
their employees to use their work hours to accomplish organizational goals. In a recent survey,
however, a majority of employees (63%) reported that they access personal e-mail at work and more
than a third of employees (34%) reported that they spend at least an hour of each workday on
personal internet use (Personal Internet Use Survey, 2008). These findings suggest that managerial
trust may, at least some of the time, be misplaced.
Managers face a constant challenge with respect to trusting their employees. The kernel of
this problem has been studied in economics using the principal-agent framework (Townsend, 1979;
Mookherjee & Png, 1989). In the classic formulation of the principal-agent problem, principals (or
managers) observe the outcome of their employees’ efforts (i.e., outputs), but not their efforts
themselves (i.e., inputs). Outcomes, however, result from a combination of employees’ efforts and
uncontrolled situational factors (e.g., market demand). The essence of the principle-agent problem is
that managers cannot directly attribute outcomes to employee actions because managers are unable
to monitor what the agent does (Grossman & Hart, 1983). Furthermore, since effort is costly for
employees, managers cannot assume that employees always contribute their maximal efforts; in
fact, principal-agent theory predicts that employees frequently will not exert their maximal effort.
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In practice, of course, managers are able to at least partially monitor their employees. In an
American Management Association survey, 66% of managers reported that they monitor the
internet connections of their employees. Almost half of the companies surveyed reported that they
use video monitoring, and nearly half (43%) monitor e-mail use and use other detailed tracking
methods, such as tracking the keystrokes of their employees (45%). Monitoring systems, however,
are expensive and their effectiveness is limited by a scare resource: managerial attention. As a
result, managers can observe only a limited sample of employee behavior. For example, in most call
centers supervisors listen to only a small fraction of the calls handled by the operators they oversee.
In this paper, we describe the influence of different monitoring schemes on trusting and
trustworthy behaviors. We examine how people change their trustworthy behavior as a function of
being monitored, and we describe how people change the trust they place in others as a function of
what they observe. Specifically we study experimentally the effects of frequency of monitoring and
whether or not the monitoring is anticipated on manager’s trusting and employee’s trustworthy
behaviors respectively.

II.

TRUST
A substantial literature demonstrates that trust is an essential ingredient for effective

organizations (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010;
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). As Robbins (2001) explains, “People in organizations need to
have positive expectations that others will not act opportunistically and take advantage of them.” (p.
11) Building and maintaining trust, however, represents a constant managerial challenge (Kim,
Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks, 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). In
many cases, managers rely on formal methods to obtain trustworthy behavior. For example,
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managers may use formal contracts (Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006; Malhotra
& Murnighan, 2002) or material incentives (Grossman & Hart, 1983) to increase desirable behavior.
These formal methods however are not always efficient. Drawing on economic theory, Stiglitz
(1987) argues that managers can often achieve only “second-best” outcomes when their employees
are self-interested (e.g., Stiglitz, 1987).
In this paper, we investigate the influence of a theoretically important and practically
relevant, but understudied managerial tool: monitoring. We investigate behavior in a laboratory
experiment with participants motivated by substantial financial incentives to examine how
monitoring influences trust behavior. We build on prior work to define trust as a willingness to
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of another person (Mayer, Davis &
Schoorman, 1995), and we study how trust between paired participants changes over time (Kim,
Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006).
A substantial body of research has used experimental methods to deepen our understanding
of trust (e.g., Malhotra, 2004; Pillutla, Malhotra & Murnighan, 2003). This stream of research
describes how incentives (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006), formal contracts (Malhotra &
Murnighan, 2002), reciprocity (Pillutla, Malhotra & Murnighan, 2003), implicit beliefs (Haselhuhn,
Schweitzer & Wood, 2010), and emotions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Lount, 2010) influence trust.
Much of this work has studied trust using a modified version of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe’s
(1995) trust game. In this game, an individual (the trustor) starts with a pot of money (e.g., $20) and
can either keep the money for herself or pass a fraction of the money to her partner. If she passes $x
to her partner (the trustee), the amount of money grows (e.g., triples to $3x), and the trustee must
then decide how to split the resulting sum of money between the trustor and himself (e.g., by
splitting it evenly, $1.5x each, or by keeping the entire $3x to himself). In a trust game with an
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initial endowment of $20 that tripled, Berg et al. (1995) found that trustors passed an average of
$5.16 (out of their initial sum of $20), and trustees returned an average of $4.66 to trustors. In this
case, trust did not pay. Trustors who trusted their counterpart and passed money were worse off, on
average, than those who did not.
Trust game research has also identified other important phenomena, such as the importance
of vulnerability in building trust. Pillutla, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2003) found that large acts that
made trustors more vulnerable were reciprocated more than small, tentative acts. Similarly, Ho and
Weigelt (2005) found that trustees frequently split the money evenly if trustors’ intention of trusting
was unambiguously altruistic in a multi-stage trust game.
Several scholars have also used repeated games to study the evolution of trust and
cooperation. In these experiments, participants play the same trust game with a fixed-matching
protocol (e.g., with the same partner) multiple times. This line of research has challenged
conventional wisdoms about trust, such as the belief that trust is fragile—once broken, it is either
very difficult or impossible to repair (Slovic, 1993; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). Experimental
research has found that the timing of the breach matters (Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan & Murnighan,
2008), and that penance (Gibson, Bottom, & Murnighan, 1999; Bottom, Gibson, Daniels &
Murnighan, 2002), cooperative actions (e.g., Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan & Murnighan, 2006),
apologies (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004), promises to
change (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), and even denials (Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin,
2006) can restore trust.
Very few studies investigate strategies trustors might adopt to contend with the problem of
exploited trust. Work that has studied this problem has found that formal contracts significantly
increase cooperation (Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006; Malhotra &

7
Murnighan, 2002). For example, Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) found that contracts promoted
very high levels of cooperation—as long as the contract was in place. When the contract was
removed, cooperation collapsed.

III.

MONITORING

A substantial literature suggests that monitoring is likely to change how people behave within
organizations. Across many social settings, people work hard to create positive impressions (Leary,
1996), and individuals pay closer attention to how they behave when others can observe them than
when others cannot (Goffman, 1959). People also strategically control the information they reveal
and the emotions they express to influence others (Goffman, 1959; Andrade & Ho, 2009).
Frequently, people present themselves in positive ways in order to get others to like them
(Schlenker & Leary, 1982). These conscious efforts facilitate social interactions and improve
efficiency in organizations (Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1990).
In addition to making actions more visible, monitoring systems may communicate
expectations. For example, by monitoring employee behavior, managers convey the belief that they
expect unmonitored employees to shirk (Frey, 1993). Niehoff and Moorman (1993) found that by
introducing monitoring systems, employee motivation and citizenship behavior declined. In some
cases, however, monitoring can lead to positive psychological consequences, such as boosting
perceptions of fairness (Niehoff & Moorman 1993).
Surprisingly little work has examined the interplay between monitoring and trust. In a field
setting, Alder, Noel and Ambrose (2006) examined employee reactions to having their internet use
restricted and monitored. Alder et al. (2006) found that employees trusted the organization more
when management had let them know in advance that their internet use would be restricted and
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monitored than when they did not. High levels of trust, however, can make members of teams
reluctant to monitor each other (Langfred, 2004), and a lack of monitoring can harm performance
and trustworthy behavior (Schweitzer & Ho, 2005). In this paper, we report results from a careful
laboratory experiment that describes how different monitoring regimes change the trust behavior of
both those who are monitored and those who monitor others.

IV.

HYPOTHESES
We develop two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses considers how monitoring

schemes influence the decision to be trustworthy. These hypotheses focus on how monitoring
changes trustee behavior. The second set of hypotheses examines how monitoring influences the
decision to trust others. These hypotheses focus on how monitoring changes trustor behavior. We
analyze the dynamics of both the trustee and the trustor behaviors over time.
In developing our hypotheses, we consider two dimensions of monitoring schemes:
frequently and anticipation. The frequency of monitoring reflects how often trustees are monitored.
The anticipation of monitoring reflects whether or not trustees know in advance that they will be
monitored. This dimension of monitoring schemes reflects the notion that some monitoring schemes
let employees know in advance (anticipated monitoring) when they will be monitored (e.g.,
announced visits or advanced warning of monitoring). Other monitoring schemes do not afford
trustees with advance notice (unanticipated monitoring).
Trustee’s behavior. People react to the behavior they observe (Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006). When people observe others’ trustworthy behavior, they reciprocate by becoming
more trusting. Trust builds steadily over time following positive experiences (Gambetta, 1988).
Conversely, when people observe untrustworthy behavior, they respond by becoming less trusting.
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As a result, trust can decline quickly and sharply (Ho & Weigelt, 2005; Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006).
Consequently, we expect trustors to react to the behavior they observe, and we expect
trustees to anticipate this. Although trustees can reap short-term gains by engaging in untrustworthy
behavior, their long-term profitability is harmed in repeated interactions when trustees do not trust
them. Hence, we expect monitoring to change trustee behavior. We expect trustees to anticipate
how trustors will respond to the trustworthy and untrustworthy behavior they observe. As a result,
we expect frequent monitoring to increase trustee’s trustworthy behavior. For trustees, detected
untrustworthy behavior is costly, so frequent monitoring increases the expected cost of engaging in
untrustworthy behavior.

H1: The frequency of monitoring is positively related to trustworthy behavior.

When trustees know in advance whether or not their behavior will be monitored, the
consequences of engaging in untrustworthy behavior are clear. We expect trustees to be very likely
to choose trustworthy actions when they anticipate that their behavior will be monitored.
Conversely, we expect trustees to be very likely to choose untrustworthy actions when they
anticipate that their behavior will not be monitored.

H2: Anticipated monitoring will increase trustworthy behavior in anticipated monitoring
rounds.
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H3: Anticipated monitoring will decrease trustworthy behavior in anticipated nonmonitoring rounds

Trustor’s behavior. Just as trustees react to monitoring, we expect trustors to react to the
information they observe. When trustors observe trustworthy behavior, we expect trustors to trust
their counterparts more in the future. When trustors observe untrustworthy behavior, we expect
trustors to curtail their trust in their counterpart. Hence, we expect trustors to react to the frequency
of monitoring. As a consequence, we expect trustors to be more trusting when the frequency of
monitoring is high than when it is low.
For similar reasons, we expect trustors to be particularly trusting when they know that their
counterpart anticipates monitoring. We expect this reciprocal relationship to facilitate the
development of a common mental model (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Senge, 1990) for trusting and
trustworthy actions when monitoring is anticipated.

H4: The frequency of monitoring is positively related to trusting behavior.

H5:Anticipated monitoring will increase trusting behavior in anticipated monitoring
rounds.

The more interesting question centers on how trustors decide to trust their counterpart when
they cannot monitor their counterpart’s actions during unmonitored rounds. Recent work suggests
that the same piece of information is weighted more heavily if it arises from direct experience rather
than from observation (Simonsohn, Karlsson, Loewenstein, & Ariely, 2008; Haselhuhn, Pope,
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Schweitzer, & Fishman, 2012). As a result, trustors may overweight the trustworthy behavior they
observe in anticipated monitoring rounds and mistakenly assume that their counterpart is
trustworthy (rather than merely strategic). We expect direct experience with trustworthy behavior to
disproportionately influence trustors. Consequently, trustors who observe trustworthy behavior in
anticipated monitoring rounds may erroneously expect their counterpart to engage in trustworthy
behavior in anticipated non-monitoring rounds.
H6: Trustors will misplace their trust and lose money in anticipated non-monitoring rounds

V.

METHODS
We used a laboratory experiment to investigate the relationship between monitoring and

trust. In this study, we randomly assigned pairs of participants to different monitoring conditions,
and we recorded their behavior in a repeated trust game. Prior work has found that this type of
behavioral measure of trust correlates closely with trust attitudes (McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber,
2012; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Participants were compensated by financial
incentives and their monetary payoffs depended on their actions, and those of their partner, and
chance.

V.1

TRUST GAME
We randomly assigned participants to assume the role of either the odd or the even player in

a repeated trust game. In each round of the game, the odd player started with an endowment of five
points. The odd player decided how much of the five points to keep for himself and how much to
pass to his even player counterpart. The even player received a multiple of the amount the odd
player passed. In this experiment, the amount the odd player passed was quadrupled. For example,
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if an odd player passed 2 points (and kept 3 points) then the even player received 8 points (i.e., 4 x 2
= 8 points). The even player then decided how much to keep for herself and how much to pass back
to the odd player. For example, if the odd player passed 2 points (and the even player received 8
points) and the even player returned 4 points, the odd player would earn 7 points (i.e., 3 + 4) and the
even player would earn 4 points (i.e., 8 - 4). The round ended after the even player made her
decision.
Each pair of participants in this experiment played the same game multiple times. Each time
they played, participants were in the same role and were matched with the same partner. We
summed the points players earned for each round that they played and converted their total points
into cash; each point was worth 10 cents. Participants were paid in cash before they left the
experiment.

V.2

DESIGN
In our experiment, we manipulated the nature of the feedback players received. Although

both players made decisions in every round, they did not always learn what their counterpart chose
in a particular round. We randomly assigned pairs of participants to one of four monitoring
conditions from a 2 (Frequency of Monitoring) x 2 (Anticipated Monitoring) factorial design.
We randomly assigned about half of our participants to a high frequency monitoring
condition and half to a low frequency monitoring condition. The chance that any one round would
be a feedback round was constant within a condition and independent of whether or not the previous
round was a feedback round (i.e. we use an independent draw to determine whether any one round
was a feedback round). In the high frequency condition there was an 80% chance that an odd player
would receive feedback each round (and learn what their even player counterpart chose for that
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particular round). In the low frequency monitoring condition there was a 40% chance that an odd
player would receive feedback each round (and learn what their even player counterpart chose for
that particular round). In rounds without monitoring, odd players did not learn what their
counterpart chose for that particular round until the experiment ended. In every round, across all
conditions, even players always learned what their odd player counterpart passed to them before
they made their decision.
We also randomly assigned participants to either an anticipated monitoring condition or an
unanticipated monitoring condition. This condition varied whether or not even players knew before
they made their decision if their current round was a feedback round. In the anticipated condition,
even players knew before they made their decision whether or not their current round was a
feedback round (in which case odd players would learn what they chose). In the unanticipated
condition, even players did not know in advance whether or not their current round was a feedback
round. Odd players always knew before they made their trusting decision whether or not the
upcoming round was a feedback round. They also knew what their even player counterpart knew
about the current round.
We randomly assigned pairs of participants to one of the four monitoring conditions from
our 2 (frequency) x 2 (anticipated) design: high frequency-anticipated, low frequency-anticipated,
high frequency-unanticipated, and low frequency-unanticipated. Both odd and even players knew
details about their own treatment condition, but were unaware of the other three conditions. In sum,
we used a 2x2 between-subject design with repeated measures. We measured both how much the
trustor passed and how much the trustee returned in each round.

V.3

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
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We recruited 204 participants from a large Northeastern university to participate in a onehour laboratory study for a $10 show up fee and the chance to earn additional money. Participants
completed the study in groups that ranged in size from 6 to 14. The average group size was 8. (If an
odd number of participants arrived to the laboratory, one participant was randomly selected,
removed from the group, paid $10, and dismissed.)
We instructed participants that they would have the opportunity to earn money in the
experiment. We explained that the total amount that they earned would depend upon the decisions
they made, the decisions their partner made, and upon chance. We seated participants at computer
terminal separated by partitions. Participants were unable to see the screens of other participants.
We randomly and anonymously paired participants with another person in their experimental
session. Participants never found out who their paired partners were.
After reading the instructions, participants answered a series of comprehension check
questions about the nature of the game and the nature of their experimental condition. The program
returned participants to the instruction page if they made a mistake in answering any of the
comprehension check questions. Most participants understood both the game instructions and their
experimental condition. However, 13 participants made repeated mistakes answering the
comprehension check questions. We dismissed both these participants and their partner. In total, we
dismissed 11 dyads (in two dyads, both pair members made repeated mistakes answering the
comprehension check questions). As a result, a total of 188 participants completed the study.
The total number of rounds participants played was randomly determined. Every dyad made
10 rounds of decisions. After the tenth round, participants had an 85 percent chance of continuing
on to the eleventh round. If there was an eleventh round, there was an 85 percent chance of
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advancing to the twelfth round, and so on. The 85 percent chance of advancing to the next round
was independent of whether participants had advanced in previous rounds.
After the last round (i.e., the game failed to advance to the next round), we revealed to all
participants their entire history and how many points they had earned in total. We paid participants
$0.10 for every point that they had earned. The introductory instructions and the comprehension
check questions covered both the stochastic ending and the payment scheme.
Across conditions, we measured the amounts odd players passed and even players returned.
We compared the amounts participants passed and returned in monitored and non-monitored
rounds, and we conducted analyses for all rounds as well as for just the first 10 rounds.

VI.

RESULTS
Of the 188 participants who completed the study, just over half of them were female

(57.45%). Dyads were randomly and independently assigned to each condition; a total of 54
participants completed the study in the high frequency-anticipated condition, 44 in the low
frequency-anticipated condition, 42 in the high frequency-unanticipated condition, and 38 in the low
frequency-unanticipated condition.
In analyzing our results, we report summary statistics as well as results from a set of logistic
regression equations. In our experimental design, we used a stochastic ending. This aspect of our
design enabled us to eliminate any end-game effect, but caused different dyads in our experiment to
complete different numbers of rounds. For completeness, we report two sets of analyses. One set of
analyses for the first 10 rounds, which every dyad experienced, and a second set of analyses for all
of the rounds.
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In Figures 1 and 2, we show participant behavior from two of the dyads in the study. In both
figures, the closed circles represent the amounts odd players passed in each round, and the open
squares represent the amounts the even player returned in each round. The decision round is
depicted along the x-axis, and the asterisk indicates that a particular round was a monitoring round.
In Figure 1, we report results for a dyad in the “Anticipated 40%” condition. In this
condition, each round had an independent, 40% probability of being a feedback or monitoring
round, and both odd and even players knew in advance whether or not the odd player would
observe what the even player chose for that particular round. As shown in Figure 1, the even player
made a series of strategic choices. In monitoring rounds, the even player always returned at least
twice what the odd player passed. In non-monitoring rounds, however, the even player always
returned 0. The odd player in this dyad, however, did not observe the even player’s strategic
behavior in the non-monitoring rounds. During the experiment, the odd player was only able to
observe the even player’s behavior in the monitoring rounds (rounds 5, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,
and 22). Hence, the odd player only observed that whenever s/he passed money, s/he received a
substantial amount in return. The odd player in this dyad failed to appreciate how differently his/her
counterpart would act when monitoring was not anticipated, and the odd player continued to pass
substantial amounts in every non-monitoring round.
In Figure 2, we depict results for a dyad in the “Unanticipated 80%” condition. In this
condition, each round had an independent, 80% probability of being a monitoring round, and though
odd players knew in advance whether or not they would receive feedback for a particular round,
even players did not know in advance whether or not their odd player counterpart would observe
what the even player chose for that particular round. In stark contrast to the dyadic behavior in
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Figure 1, both even and odd players were about equally likely to pass and return in monitoring and
non-monitoring rounds.
Trustee’s trustworthy behavior: In Table 1, we report the average amounts that participants
passed/returned across conditions for the monitoring and non-monitoring rounds. The right panel
of Table 1 (labeled as All Rounds) shows that even players returned the most in anticipated
feedback rounds (7.05 points and 7.44 points) and returned the least in anticipated no-feedback
rounds (3.17 points and 3.64 points). The discrepancy between what even players returned in the
anticipated feedback and the anticipated non-feedback rounds was a function of two things: the
amounts odd players passed (which influenced how much they were able to return) and even
players’ strategic behavior.
Table 2 reports the average percentages that participants passed/returned across conditions
for the monitoring and non-monitoring rounds. The right panel of Table 2 (labeled as All Rounds)
shows that, on average, even players returned the highest percentage of their endowment in the
anticipated feedback rounds, 40% and 42% in the “Anticipated 40%” and the “Anticipated 80%”
conditions. Even players returned the lowest percentage of their endowment in the anticipated nofeedback rounds, 18% and 24% on average in the “Anticipated 40%” and the “Anticipated 80%”
conditions. These results suggest that even players were strategic in their returning behaviors in
anticipated conditions.
As expected, when even players could not anticipate whether or not a round would be a
monitoring round, they returned very similar amounts in both monitoring and non-monitoring
rounds. The right panel of Table 2 shows that even players returned 32% of their endowment in
both the monitoring and non-monitoring rounds in the “Unanticipated 80%” condition, and 33%
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and 30% of their endowment in the monitoring and non-monitoring rounds, in the “Unanticipated
40%” condition.
Trustor’s trusting behavior: The right panel of Table 1 shows that in the anticipated
monitoring conditions (both “Anticipated 40%” and “Anticipated 80%” conditions), odd players
passed the most in anticipated monitoring rounds (3.83 and 4.12), and the least in anticipated nonmonitoring rounds (2.90 and 3.58). Recall that odd players always knew in advance whether or not
they would observe trustee’s behavior in a particular round; what varied was whether or not even
players knew in advance whether or not their counterpart would observe their behavior in a
particular round. The right panel of Table 1 also shows that odd players passed similar amounts in
monitoring and non-monitoring rounds in the unanticipated monitoring conditions. Specifically, odd
player passed on average 3.24 (40% unanticipated) and 3.32 (80% unanticipated) in monitoring
rounds and 3.00 and 3.08 in corresponding non-monitoring rounds respectively.

Logistic Regression Analysis
To formally analyze our results, we conducted logistic regression analyses. We report results
for four related models in Table 3. In these models, we created binary variables to denote whether or
not odd players chose to trust their counterpart by passing 5 (their total endowment), and whether or
not even players chose trustworthy behavior by returning a substantial amount of money. We
defined even player’s trustworthy behavior as returning half of their endowment (10) to the odd
player (models 1 and 2) or as returning at least what their odd player counterpart had passed to them
(5) in models 3 and 4. In models 1 and 3 we analyzed just the first 10 rounds of decisions (which
every dyad experienced), and in models 2 and 4 we analyzed all of the rounds of decisions. We used
these binary variables as dependent variables in our logistic regression analysis. The independent
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variables were: whether or not the monitoring was anticipated (A), whether or not the frequency of
feedback was high or low (H), whether or not a monitoring or feedback round was anticipated
(F(r)*A), the percentage of trustworthy behavior in feedback rounds (n(t)), and whether or not
trustworthy behavior was anticipated (A*n(t))).
The results at the bottom panel of Table 3 allow us to test Hypotheses 1-3. Supporting
Hypothesis 1, we find that even players returned more when the frequency of monitoring was high.
This is true across all four models, with significant coefficients for H. Consistent with Hypothesis 2,
even players were very strategic with respect to their behavior. Even players returned much more in
the anticipated feedback rounds. This is true across all four models, with significant coefficients for
F(r)*A. Even players, however, returned significantly less in the anticipated conditions overall,
represented by the high negative value of the coefficient for A, which was significant in all four
models, confirming Hypothesis 3.
The results at the top panel of Table 3 allow us to test Hypotheses 4-6. Table 3 shows that
odd players passed more to even players when the frequency of monitoring was high. Across the
four models, the coefficient for H (H) was consistently significant, confirming Hypothesis 4. There
was a significant interaction between feedback and anticipation. Odd players passed more when
they knew a forthcoming round was a feedback and anticipated round. This is evidenced by the
significant coefficient (FA) across four all models, supporting Hypothesis 5.
To explore whether odd players respond to past trustworthy behavior of even players we
included the fraction of even players’ trustworthy behavior in feedback rounds. Consistent with
prior work demonstrating that people respond to positive feedback, we find that odd players passed
more when trustees had been trustworthy. This is true across all four models, with significant
coefficients for n(t).
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Supporting Hypothesis 6, odd players failed to anticipate how strategically even players
would act in anticipated no-feedback rounds. Though odd players passed less in the anticipated nofeedback rounds than they did in the anticipated feedback rounds, they were still more trusting than
the return would justify (i.e. they made less money by passing). This was evidenced by the
coefficient value for A, which was significant in 3 out of 4 models, and less negative than the
coefficient value for A in the return behavior for the even player.
For each round in which odd players passed money to their even counterpart, we calculated
their rate of return. (Recall that the amount odd players passed to their even counterpart
quadrupled.) If even players returned half of what they received, odd players would earn a 100%
rate of return. For example, if an odd player passed 5, her even counterpart would receive 20. If the
even counterpart returned 10, the odd player would earn a 100% rate of return on the 5 she passed.
If even players returned the same amount odd players passed, odd players would earn a 0% rate of
return, and if even players returned no money, odd players would earn a -100% rate of return.)
When feedback was unanticipated, the rate of return was similar for both the feedback and
no-feedback rounds. In the 80% feedback condition, the rates of return were 59.95% and 66.83%,
respectively. In the 40% feedback condition, the rates of return were 33.86% and 34.4%,
respectively.
More interestingly, the rates of return were dramatically different across the feedback and
no-feedback rounds in the anticipated feedback conditions. In the 80% feedback condition, odd
players earned a 73.91% rate of return in feedback rounds, but -0.6% in the no-feedback rounds. In
the 40% feedback condition, odd players earned a 70.37% rate of return in feedback rounds, but 11.9% in no-feedback rounds. That is, when monitoring was anticipated, odd players earned
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substantial returns in monitored rounds, but lost money when their counterpart anticipated that a
lack of monitoring.

VII.

DISCUSSION
Our work investigates how monitoring schemes influence trust behavior. We report results

from a repeated trust game experiment with participants motivated by substantial financial
incentives. We examine how different monitoring systems influence the behavior of both those who
are monitored and those who monitor and observe their counterpart’s behavior.
We demonstrate that monitoring schemes significantly influence behavior. When people are
monitored frequently, they are more likely to choose trustworthy actions than when they are
monitored infrequently. Similarly, people who monitor frequently are more likely to choose trusting
actions. These individuals can observe whether their trusting actions are reciprocated with
trustworthy behaviors.
When individuals anticipate being monitored, they behave strategically. In our experiment,
individuals who knew when they would be monitored chose trustworthy actions when they would
be monitored and untrustworthy actions when they would not be monitored. Prescriptively, these
findings suggest that monitoring systems, if possible, should be unanticipated. When even players
did not know in advance whether or not their behavior would be monitored, they were significantly
more trustworthy than when they knew in advance whether or not their behavior would be
monitored. This uncertainty promoted trustworthy behavior.
Individuals who observed others’ behaviors chose more trusting actions in monitored than
unmonitored rounds. Importantly, however, these individuals failed to anticipate how strategically
their counterpart would behave. Though odd players trusted their counterparts less when they
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anticipated no monitoring, their adjustments were insufficient. Odd players in these rounds passed
far more money to even payers then they received in return. As a result, trusting behavior in
anticipated non-monitored rounds resulted in a negative return. This mental model failure is striking
because both the odd and even players were drawn from the same subject pool and randomly
assigned to each role in our study.
Like contracts (Bottom et al., 2002; Bottom et al., 2006; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002),
monitoring systems attempt to promote trustworthy behavior by changing incentives. By increasing
the visibility of behavior, monitoring allows trustors to punish those they observe to be
untrustworthy. Our research suggests that this approach for promoting trust can have important,
unintended consequences: managers may systematically misplace their trust when employees
expect not to be monitored. In addition, monitoring systems harm an organizational culture by
communicating distrust.
The problem of misplacing trust may be particularly important for managers. Not only do
managers routinely face the challenge of trusting others, but they may also be especially illequipped to content with it. Perspective taking within trust relationships is difficult in general
(Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004), and high status individuals, like managers, tend to be
particularly trusting (Lount & Pettit, 2012).
Our research demonstrates that in addition to consuming scarce managerial attention,
monitoring systems can change the relationship between managers who monitor and employees
who are being monitored. Future research should explore the full range of consequences of
monitoring systems. In addition, future work should investigate other approaches for promoting
trust, such as building a sense of shared identity (Shapiro, Sheppard, Cheraskin 1992).
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Managers face a constant challenge with respect to trusting their employees. Our work
demonstrates that managers should view the behavior they observe skeptically, consider changing
the nature of the monitoring system they use, and recognize that what they cannot see may be far
more indicative of trustworthiness than what they can.
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Table 1: Average Amounts Passed/Returned by Role, Condition, and Round Type

Odd

Even

Condition
Anticipated (n=44)
Unanticipated (n=38)
Anticipated (n=54)
Unanticipated (n=42)

40%
40%
80%
80%

Anticipated (n=44)
Unanticipated (n=38)
Anticipated (n=54)
Unanticipated (n=42)

40%
40%
80%
80%

First 10 Rounds
Monitoring
Non-Monitoring
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
3.82 (1.42)
2.94 (1.62)
3.06 (1.38)
2.92 (1.38)
4.03 (1.19)
3.39 (1.73)
3.45 (1.17)
3.40 (1.65)
7.00
4.54
7.25
5.81

(3.17)
(3.19)
(3.02)
(2.94)

3.14
4.33
4.35
5.79

All Rounds
Monitoring
Non-Monitoring
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
3.83 (1.46)
2.90
(1.70)
3.24 (1.49)
3.00
(1.51)
4.12 (1.17)
3.58
(1.52)
3.32 (1.30)
3.08
(1.90)

(3.28)
(3.04)
(4.11)
(3.59)

7.05
4.88
7.44
5.60

(3.31)
(3.36)
(3.01)
(3.11)

3.17
4.57
3.64
5.25

(3.27)
(3.34)
(3.65)
(3.92)

Table 2: Percent of the Total Endowment Even Players Returned to Odd

Condition
Anticipated
Unanticipated
Anticipated
Unanticipated

40%
40%
80%
80%

First 10 Rounds
NonMonitoring
Monitoring
Mean SD
Mean SD
41% (0.16)
18% (0.17)
32% (0.14)
31% (0.14)
43% (0.13)
29% (0.22)
35% (0.14)
34% (0.20)

All Rounds
NonMonitoring
Monitoring
Mean SD
Mean SD
40% (0.16)
18% (0.17)
32% (0.14)
32% (0.14)
42% (0.13)
24% (0.21)
33% (0.15)
30% (0.21)

Note: These percentages exclude all cases in which Even players received 0 (and hence had no choice to make).
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Analyses
Model 1
Parameter Estimate
Odd Player
Intercept, a
Anticipated A, A

Model 2
Parameter Estimate

Model 3
Parameter Estimate

Model 4
Parameter Estimate

-1.25 **
-0.44 **

(.10)
(.09)

-1.66 **
-0.06

(.15)
(.25)

-1.04 **
-0.52 *

(.10)
(.21)

-0.68 **
-0.82 **

(.11)
(.10)

High Feedback H, H

0.48 **

(.12)

0.70 **

(.12)

0.57 **

(.13)

0.69 **

(.11)

Interaction F(r)*A, FA

0.91 **

(.10)

0.87 **

(.17)

0.82 **

(.12)

0.83 **

(.04)

# Trustworthy/ # Feedback, n(t)

0.96 **

(.10)

1.66 **

(.14)

0.29 **

(.10)

0.20 **

(.06)

Interaction A*n(t), An(t)

0.65 **

(.11)

-0.03

(.21)

0.68 **

(.19)

0.77 **

(.08)

-1.03 **
-0.98 **

(.14)
(.26)

-1.13 **
-1.37 **

(.13)
(.23)

1.01 **
-1.56 **

(.10)
(.22)

1.48 **
-2.36 **

(.12)
(.22)

High Feedback H, H

0.85 **

(.13)

0.80 **

(.12)

0.54 **

(.11)

0.30 **

(.10)

Interaction F(r)*A, FA

1.67 **

(.22)

2.13 **

(.16)

2.18 **

(.25)

2.77 **

(.22)

# Trustworthy/ # Feedback, n(t)

0.78 **

(.17)

1.04 **

(.11)

1.02 **

(.12)

0.20

(.15)

Interaction A*n(t), An(t)

0.33

(.24)

0.24

(.19)

-0.44 **

(.12)

0.48 *

(.23)

Even Player
Intercept, a
Anticipated A, A

Log-likelihood

-847

-1308

-765

-1226

Model 1: Odd Passes At Least 5 and Even Returns At Least 10 .
Every dyad played for at least 10 rounds. Results for this analysis include only the first ten rounds.
Model 2: Odd Passes At Least 5 and Even Returns At Least 10.
Results for this analysis include all of the rounds. Some dyads played games that had more rounds than others.
Model 3: Odd Passes At Least 5 and Even Returns Initial Endowment.
Every dyad played for at least 10 rounds. Results for this analysis include only the first ten rounds.
Model 4: Odd Passes At Least 5 and Even Returns Initial Endowment.
Results for this analysis include all of the rounds. Some dyads played games that had more rounds than others.
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Figures

Figure 1: Example Dyad from the Anticipated 40% Condition
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Figure 2: Example Dyad from the Unanticipated 80% Condition
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